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SOCIAL SCIENCE "THEORY" AND THE LEGAL
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR KEITH 0. HAWKINS
EMORY KIMBROUGH, JR.*
Professor Keith Hawkins in his paper on legal decision making has made
abundantly clear the complexities thereof, and proposes two basic models by
which the whole issue might be illuminated. It is the basic contention of the
remarks to follow that legal decision-making is but a specialized form of
decision-making in general, and that, if this be the case, the work of the
social scientist in dealing with the process itself and the context within which
it takes place might indeed provide some valuable insights with respect
thereto. The present paper therefore will be directed to the application of a
sampling of the social-science theoretical literature to the legal decision-
making process, relying primarily upon ideas drawn from the literature of
complex organizational theory, sociological theory, and, to a most cautious
degree, economic theory. It should be acknowledged early on that at times
the connection between a given theory and the decision-making process might
appear to be somewhat weak; nevertheless, useful results might be forth-
coming.
A profitable beginning might be made by asking what decision-making
is in the first place. The literature on complex organizations is full of
attempts to address such a question, usually from the perspective of how
managers go about making decisions within the organizational context. Such
quite often involve extremely elaborate "systems models," and are perhaps
more noteworthy for their elegance than their utility.' A good example of
an attempt at definition is to be found in Shull, Delbecq, and Cummings'
Organizational Decision Making:2 "A conscious and human process, involv-
ing both individual and social phenomena, based upon factual and value
premises, which concludes with a choice of one behavioral activity from
among one or more alternatives with the intention of moving toward some
desired state of affairs." The same authors identify at least three sets of
variables which should be considered in an investigation of the process: 3
1. the decision maker, including his subjective perceptions of the
problem and his unique frame of reference for his intellectual
ruminations;
* Ph.D.; Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Sociology,
Washington and Lee University.
1. E.g., F. KAsT & J. ROSENZWEIG, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 403-34 (1970).
2. F. SCHULL, JR., A. DELBECQ, & L. CUMMINGS, ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 31
(1970).
3. Id. at 27.
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2. the ends and goals being sought, either those of the system, or
his private set of values or some mix of the two; and
3. the environment within which the action is to take place.
The conception of decision making expressed in the position developed
by Shull, et al., would be considered to be an example of the open system
model of decision making. Kast and Rosenzweig elaborate upon that model
further by saying that
The open-system model of decision making is an attempt to describe
a more realistic process for individual and organizational decision
making. It focuses on human involvement in the various steps of
the process and allows for the impact of numerous environmental
forces. This view opens the system by eliminating the assumption of
classical rationality. That is, we do not assume that the decision
maker has complete knowledge and is a logical, systematic maxi-
mizer.... Concentration on the human element leads to concepts
such as learning and adaptation. Continual feedback during the
decision process causes adjustments in both ends and means. The
system is dynamic rather than static; thus explicit computational
techniques must give way to more judgmental approaches.
4
The open-system model thus would regard the legal decision making mech-
anism or system to constitute a "natural whole," and system changes are
seen to be regarded more or less unplanned, and everything is in a state of
emergence, development, evolution, etc. Also, and quite crucially, much
attention is given to the nature and operations of the environment.
After considering in general terms the nature of the open-system concept,
one still must ask whether such a concept or model really applies in the legal
decision-making process. Some would undoubtedly argue in the negative,
and say that the adjudicative type of decision-making would more properly
be described as a closed system, since much of it is bounded by law and
judicial precedent, and geared to goal attainment (a decision) via the utili-
zation of rational strategies. The late James Thompson in describing the
closed system model noted that
The rational model . . . results in everything being functional ...
making a positive, indeed optimum, contribution to the over-all
result. All resources are appropriate resources, and their allocation
fits a master plan. All action is appropriate action, and its outcomes
are predictable.5
How might this question be resolved? Perhaps a tentative resolution
would suggest that since there is a tendency for the adjudicative decision-
4. F. KAST & J. ROSENZWEIG, supra note 1, at 405.




maker to be bound by certain strictures inherent in the law, the closed system
model would largely apply; most of the balance of the legal decision-making
process is much more fluid, and hence more accurately described via the open-
systems model. In conclusion, it is being suggested here that the systems con-
cepts, both open and closed, and, in particular, the definition of decision-
making derived therefrom, might be useful in an investigation of the legal
decision-making process.
The discussion of the problem of the definition of the term decision-making
from the perspective of the social sciences, especially the complex organizational
theory component thereof, hopefully has a bearing upon what legal actors
and other significant decision makers in the legal decision-making sphere
actually do. The systems models developed by social scientists could help
one understand better the "frame" within which legal decisions are worked
out, and therefore introduce an enhanced degree of "reality" therein; perhaps
all that has been said might be adequately summed up by the following
statement:
Decision making is a social event to the extent for example, that
facts and values are social phenomena. The validity of a "fact" is
often the function of the incidence in society of observation of an
event. Values often reflect group norms which have been internalized
by the members .... The decision process, the concept of the
problem, and the variables considered are most often sociological in
nature. 6
We now turn to a consideration of some of the specific issues raised by
Professor Hawkins in his paper, and only a rather limited number of aspects
will be considered. Once again, the strategy to be employed herein is to ask
whether a particular idea, aspect, etc., might be better appreciated if analyzed
via the framework of social science "theory." To such concerns we now
turn.
Legal decision-making of a negotiative form: Professor Hawkins rightly
points out that a considerable portion of the legal decision-making process
involves the negotiations carried on by the various participants in legal
decisions, and perhaps there is the implicit assumption made that more is
known about the adjudicative decision than about the negotiated decision.
If this be the case, might not the social sciences, particularly sociology, be
able to make some contributions to our understanding of the latter? The
sociologist of course is very much committed to the study of various types
of groups, and one type typically identified in many sociology texts would
be the formal decision-making group. DeFleur, D'Antonio, and DeFleur
note that
Increasingly important in modern society are small groups, such as
committees, commissions, councils, juries, boards of supervisors,
6. Id.
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and other appointed or elected groups, which are formed for the
specific purpose of making decisions and formulating policies within
larger organizational structures .... [I]n spite of ... obstacles,
however, social scientists have accumulated an impressive amount of
information about the social organization and patterns of interaction
that are characteristic of small task-oriented groups.
7
This type of group certainly would be found on the negotiative level of legal
decision-making. DeFleur and his colleagues note that the formal decision
making group is characterized by the following dimensions:
1. The interplay of formal and unstated goals (collective/individual
goals).
2. The typical pattern of interaction: collecting information, eval-
uating information collected, reaching a decision, restoring equi-
librium.
3. The interplay of formal and informal roles: although there are
officially designated leaders, quite often particular members are
likely to assume informal leadership roles: the best idea man,
the one who gives guidance to the group, etc., even the one who
provides "comic relief."
4. Social control: When a decision making group operates within
the context of some larger group, as is usually the case, the
formal controls of the larger group carry over into the smaller
one.
5. Ranking systems:
1. Both role-playing and relative rank within a small decision
making group are influenced by the status and roles that mem-
bers have outside the group.
2. Both role playing and relative ranking within a small decision-
making group are influenced by the status and roles that mem-
bers have outside the group.
3. The pattern that evolves may represent a complex of several
different ranking systems, each based upon different criteria:
hierarchy of relative popularity, hierarchy of relative power,
etc."
In a study of jury deliberations, Strodbeck and Mann identified many of the
above aspects as being present.9 Perhaps it can be suggested that research
7. J. DEFLEUR, W. D'ANTONIO, & L. DEFLEUR, SOCIOLOGY: HUMAN SOCIETY 67 (1974).
8. Id. at 68-70.
9. F. Strodtbeck & R. Mann, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberations, 19 SocloM-
ETRY 3-11 (1956).
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which has been carried out on both "natural" and "artificial" formal
decision-making groups might shed a considerable amount of light upon the
dynamics of the negotiated legal decision making process.
On the location of legal decision-making authority: Professor Hawkins
suggests that there is a considerable amount of diffusion in legal decision-
making authority, noting several illustrations to establish the point. Might one
discover a model or construct which would add focus to this particular idea?
One possibly useful model might be that developed by John Kenneth Galbraith
in his book, The New Industrial State: the Idea of Technostructure.'0 The
technostructure, accodring to Professor Galbraith, "embraces all who bring
specialized knowledge, talent, or experience to group decision-making pro-
cesses." The technostructure thus is made up of all those personnel, from
the top of the lower reaches, who are charged with the acquisition and the
processing of information. The technostructure is seen, therefore, to be the
"guiding intelligence" of the "organization" or structure, and hence the prime
decision-making apparatus." Although Professor Galbraith has the large
business firm in mind as he develops the concept of technostructure, it might
be a useful tool for the exploration of how legal decision-making personnel
are in fact organized within the legal structure. Such an approach would sen-
sitize the user to the collective nature of that structure, and would have one
look beyond just the "significant legal personalities" aspect.
One particular area warrants further elaboration, and such bears upon
the issue of autonomy. Galbraith argues that the technostructure strives to
be protected from outside intervention. Might not the same be said for the
legal technostructure in its transactions with its environments? In looking
within the technostructure, perhaps another aspect of the question of auton-
omy arises: to what extent do those who are involved in the negotiative
realm try to protect themselves from arbitrary interventions on the part of
adjudicating officials, or indeed, any other pressure groups?
Influences upon legal discretion: Professor Hawkins states that ... it
is still empirically rather unclear how legal rules or statements actually
influence legal discretion, and it is difficult methodologically to throw light
on the issue by listening to decision makers discuss their judgments in a
formal fashion. . . ." If Vilfredo Pareto,' 2 the important late nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century economist and sociologist were alive today, he
would undoubtedly argue that only under the rarest of circumstances do
human actors act in a logical manner, and that most human behavior is
nonlogical in nature. Perhaps the only clear-cut examples of logical behavior
would be the person in the market place attempting to maximize payoff, and
the scientist in the laboratory attempting to explore a scientific problem.
Most behavior results from "sentiments" hidden deep within the psyche of
10. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 71 (1967).
11. Id.
12. See D.V. PM-rEo, THE IND AND SOCMTY (1935).
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the organism which produce behavior tendencies (residues), which must be
"explained" or justified (derivations). The theory suggests that we act, make
a decision, etc., and justify (explain) after the fact.'
3
Pareto goes beyond the individual decision maker and looks at law itself
in somewhat the same vein:
A lesser error, but still quite a serious one, is to assume that court
decisions in a given country are made in accord with its written laws.
The constitutions of the Byzantine emperors were often a dead letter.
In our day, both in Italy and in France the written laws of the civil
code may supply at least an approximate picture of practical legis-
lation; but the penal code and its written laws do not in the least
correspond with practical decision, and the divergence is frequently
enormous. We need say nothing of constitutional law. There is no
relation whatever between theory and practice, except in the minds
of a few silly theorists.
A practical fact is the result of many other facts, some of which
give rise to theories and may therefore be learned through them.
Take, for example, a penal decision following the verdict of a jury.
Distinguishable among the factors entering into such a sentence are
the following: (1) Written law-the part it plays in criminal cases is
often insignificant. (2) Political influences-in certain cases very
important. (3) Humanitarian inclinations in judges and jurymen-
these are knowable from humanitarian theory and literary sources.
(4) Emotional, socialistic, social, political, and other inclinations on
the part of jurymen-all knowable from theories and literary sources.
(5) The general notion common to all despotisms, whether royal,
oligarchical, or democratic, that law does not bind the "sovereign,"
and that the "sovereign" may substitute personal whims for enacted
law. This notion, too, is knowable through theories. In our day it is
the fashion to say that "what we need is a'living' law," a "flexible"
law, a law that "adapts itself to the public conscience." Those are
all euphemisms for the caprice of the individuals in power. (6)
Numberless other inclinations, which are not perhaps generally ino-
perative, but which may chance to be preponderant in the minds of
the twelve individuals-usually of no great intelligence, no serious
education, no very high moral sense-who are called upon to serve
on juries." (7) Private interests of the citizens in question. (8) The
temporary impression made upon them by some striking fact-so
after a series of startling crimes juries are inclined to be severe for
a time.
In a word, it may be said that court decisions depend largely upon
the interests and sentiments operative in a society at a given moment;
13. See id. 171-230.
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and also upon individual whims and chance events; and but slightly,
and sometimes not at all, upon codes or written law.'
4
On the question of rationality in the legal decision-making process:
Professor Hawkins might be accused of somewhat understating the matter
when he says that "... it is quite possible that the image of the rational,
calculating introspective decisionmaker can be over-extended, and it is nec-
essary to contemplate the possibility that many kinds of legal decisions can
be made without being logically thought through, because they are made on
impulse, or because they are made in conformity with'normal'-if often
intellectually unexplored-ways of deciding matters." The same sort of
reservation concerning rationality in the decision-making process has been
raised in the literature on complex organizations, and perhaps the most
important statement has been made by such writers as Cyert,'5 March, 6 and
Simon.' 7 Two "models" of man (decision maker) are put forth: First, the
"rational" decision-maker who is able to make rational calculations and
rational decisions once he has decided upon his goals; and, second, the
"intendedly" rational decision-maker who attempts to be rational; but his
limited capacities and the limited capacities of the organization (or structure)
prevent anything anywhere near complete rationality. What, then, does the
intendedly rational man do in the process of trying to make a decision? In
contrast to the "rational" decision-maker, who seeks to optimize his payoff,
that is, to formulate the best possible decisions, the intendedly rational
decision-maker is willing to satisfice, that is, to make a decision which is a
reasonably adequate one with respect to a particular issue. In other words,
he is willing to settle for a decision that would work, and he is both unwilling
and unable to conduct a long laborious search for the "one best alternative."
It would appear that it would be worthwhile to consider to what extent
the satisficing model might be relevant vis-a-vis both the adjudicative and
the negotiational sectors of the decision-making process. As is suggested in
Professor Hawkins's paper, negotiation most likely plays a more crucial role
in the higher reaches of the judiciary than might generally be recognized.
In the same general context, Professor Hawkins confronts us with a
rather interesting issue when he states that ". . . it is still empirically rather
unclear how legal rules affect discretion," etc. Can we perhaps agree with
the position put forth by Professor Karl Weick when he argues" that
organizations are not the tight, rationally contrived structures that they are
usually construed to be, especially by authors of administration texts? He
argues via the idea of "loose coupling" that rationalized procedures are
indeed rather rare in real organizations, and that organizations are composed
14. Id. at 278-281.
15. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963).
16. Id.; J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1959).
17. Id.; H. SIMON, ADMINJSTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1957).
18. K. Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosley Coupled Systems, 21 AD. ScI. Q. 1-19
(1976).
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of units and processes which maintain their own identity, are semi-independ-
ent, being only loosely related to one another. The implication of this
argument is simply that there is much going on in an organizational setting
that is not consciously and directly under the control of some rational
controlling mechanism, that the organization is not characterized by its
component parts existing in "lock-step" relations with all other parts. This
image of organizations in general, and, perhaps, legal decision-making in
particular, would force one to wonder whether in a given case outcomes are
really intended by organization/system leaders, or, as Weick puts it, actions
are really the result of intentions. Thus, if Weick be correct, much that takes
place is not the result of willful intent, but the result of the fact of "loose
coupling." Perhaps there would be some utility forthcoming if we would try
to identify "loose coupling tendencies in the legal decision-making mecha-
nism, as Weick has tried to do with respect to the educational sector.
The rationalistic and naturalistic models of legal decision-making: To
some extent, the nature and faults of the rationalistic decision-making model
have already been addressed in this paper, and perhaps the most significant
judgment forthcoming is that it is not a terribly accurate representation of
the real world. In the general development of sociological theory, the
rationalistic type is sometimes equated with the use of a scientific methodo-
logical orientation (positivism or neo-positivism) as opposed to a "humanist"
orientation. All of this of course evokes an image of society which suggests
that, although things do go wrong and unfortunate things occur, there is
order, stability, pattern, and such can be perceived and comprehended via
the senses. Much of contemporary sociological theory, particularly that of
the Parsonian and/or functional persuasions, has followed this particular
logic, and has been criticized, mainly by the conflict school, for embracing
an image that patently distorts reality.
Turning to the naturalistic type of legal decision-making, one might
begin by inquiring further into the nature of that perspective. Professor
William Catton obliges us by providing us with a set of criteria with which
it can be determined whether a given approach is indeed naturalistic in
nature: ' 9
1. A study is naturalistic only to the extent that it asks questions
whose answers depend on sensory observation (with the aid of
instruments when necessary). Thus naturalism stresses "objectiv-
ity"-in the sense that the conclusions of a study are subject to
corroboration in parallel research by other investigators.
2. A study is naturalistic only if it seeks to explain given phenomena
by reference to data that are or could be available prior to (or
at least concurrently with) observations of the phenomena to be
explained. It must shun outright teleological explanation.
19. W. CATTON, JR., FROM ANIMISTIC TO NATURALISTIC SOCIOLOGY 5 (1966).
1262 [Vol. 43:1255
SOCIAL SCIENCE "THEORY"
3. A study is naturalistic only if it considers change, rather than
continuity, to be the problem requiring explanation. This third
element of naturalism may be called the "axiom of inertia."
4. Finally, a study is naturalistic only if it posits no "unmoved
movers"-i.e., never explains a change in terms of something
that does not itself change. One of the distinguishing traits of
certain forms of animistic thought has been the adherence to
the unmoved mover concept.
To a considerable degree it could be argued that the general conception of
the organization developed by Professor Weick discussed earlier also might
be considered to be a naturalistic model.
Professor Hawkins, however, chooses to focus not so much on theories
pertaining to structures, but rather upon naturalistic interpretations of human
behavior. In particular, he is suggesting that the phenomenological and the
ethnomethodological orientations come close to capturing the reality of the
legal decision-making process. These two approaches might be considered to
be a reaction against the excessive distortions of reality perpetuated by the
rationalistic model. Taken together, one would have the analyst "bracket"
all metaphysical and epistemological presumptions, to get at the "essence"
of the actor's perception of his world, to ascertain the meanings attributed
by actors to the world, and to identify those techniques developed by actors
to facilitate an understanding of the world. 20 Focusing more specifically upon
ethnomethodology, Poloma states that, "Put simply, the ethnomethodologist
is concerned about how ... people make sense of their everyday world. The
ethnomethodologist is concerned about the way persons ascribe order or
pattern to their reality." 2'
Professor Hawkins is asserting that a major means of achieving an
understanding of the legal decision-making process is to try to comprehend
how legal decision-makers do go about making sense of their everyday world,
and that the phenomenological/ethnomethodological approaches might be
useful in such an endeavor. Whether either strategy taken individually, or
both together, can "deliver the goods" is of course still a matter of
considerable conjecture, but, at least, one or both may provide a first step,
theoretically speaking.
A more traditionally minded sociologist might ask at this point whether
a formulation developed by the great German social scientist Max Weber
might be a more useful way to understand the legal decision-making question.
In his discussion of how the analyst comprehends sociological data, he argues
that such can be done on two levels: the level of causally adequate under-
standing (erklaren), and understanding on the level of meaning. Causally
adequate understanding (which is reasonably close to the rationalistic model)
20. For a discussion of phenomenology and ethnomethodology, see J. TURNER, THE
STRUCTURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 393-421 (rev. ed. 1978).
21. M. POLOMA, CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGIcAL THEORY 181 (1979).
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is described by Weber the following way: "An interpretation of a sequence
of events is causally adequate if careful observations lead to the generalization
that it is probable that the sequence always will occur in the same way."22
Secher, in the introduction to his English translation of Weber, further
elaborates this position when he notes that "A causally adequate interpre-
tation is achieved when the probability of a recurrence of a phenomenon
under the same circumstance is empirically determined." 23
Understanding on the level of the meaning is seen by Weber to involve
two dimensions: the understanding of subjective meaning of another's act
(deuten), and the understanding of motive (verstehen). Understanding on the
level of meaning appears to come quite close to the naturalistic mode of
comprehending the legal decision-making process. However, Weber is not
content just to provide us two modes of understanding: adequate compre-
hension must involve both causally adequate understanding, and understand-
ing on the level of meaning. In Weber's own words,
A correct causal interpretation of typical action means that the
process which is claimed to be typical is shown to be both adequately
grasped on the level of meaning and at the same time the interpre-
tation is to some degree causally adequate. If adequacy in respect to
meaning is lacking, then no matter how high the degree of uniformity
and how precisely its probability can be numerically determined, it
is still an incomprehensible statistical probability.
24
As Nicholas Timasheff points out, ". . . the most adequate explanation in
terms of meaning has no causal significance if there is no proof of the
probability of the action in question; at best it remains a plausible hypoth-
esis.''
2
The views of Max Weber presented above might therefore have something
to say to the issue raised by Professor Hawkins: the dichotomy between the
rationalistic and the naturalistic approaches. Perhaps there is some way to
reduce the dichotomy in favor of a rapprochement between some of the
elements of the rationalistic and the naturalistic orientations. How to achieve
such is certainly beyond the scope of the present paper; even Max Weber
was unable to supply a totally suitable solution to the problem he addressed.
On Professor Hawkins's views concerning statistical decision theory:
Professor Hawkins argues that the use of statistical decision theory is not so
much inappropriate as premature. The present writer would heartily agree
with Professor Hawkins, and would be joined by numerous other sociologists
who have the same sentiments. Some prominent nineteenth-century theorists,
22. See N. TMASHEFF, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY: ITS NATURE AND GROWTH 172 (1967) (quoting
Weber).
23. M. WEBER, BASIC CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 17 (H. Secher trans. 1972).
24. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 99 (T. Parsons ed.
1947).
25. See N. TIHASHEFF, supra note 22, at 178.
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including Georg Simmel, voiced misgivings about placing too much emphasis
upon the statistical approach in general. Perhaps the most important recent
statement is to be found in Professor Lewis A. Coser's presidential address
before the American Sociological Association in 1975; in discussing the
training of sociologists, he made the following observation:
There is at least some evidence that we tend to produce young
sociologists with superior research skills but with a trained incapacity
to think in theoretically innovative ways. Much of our present way
of thinking as well as our system of rewards for scientific contribu-
tions encourages our students to eschew the risks of theoretical work
and to search instead for the security that comes with proceeding
along a well traveled course, chartered though it may be by ever
more refined instruments of navigation .... Too many enthusiastic
researchers seem to be in the same situation as Saint Augustine when
he wrote, on the concept of time, "For so it is, Oh Lord, My God.
I measure it but what it is I measure I do not know. 26
In conclusion, the present writer has attempted to demonstrate how the
issues raised by Professor Keith Hawkins in his paper on legal decision-
making might be to some degree illuminated by a sampling of theories drawn
from the complex organizational, sociological, and economic sectors. Al-
though in some cases these theories do not completely "fit" the legal
situation, perhaps a consideration of such would provoke questions which
otherwise would not be asked, and insights which might not otherwise
emerge. As noted much earlier in this paper, legal decision-making is a social
endeavor, and not just an exercise in logic. After all, as Justice Holmes
stated in The Common Law: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."
2 7
26. L. Coser, Two Methods in Search of a Substance, 40 Am. Soc. REv. 692, 693 (1985).
27. 0. HOLMES, JR., TnE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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